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Abstract
In this paper, we use financial valuation techniques to measure the unfunded liabilities associated with the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) single-employer pension insurance program. This is an
alternative approach to the calculations of expected future PBGC payouts in the PBGC exposure reports. The
PBGC insurance is akin to an exchange option, a financial instrument that allows a party to exchange one risky
asset for another. Calculating the value of this option for each PBGC-covered plan provides a measure of the
fair market price of the PBGC guarantee that is consistent with the finance principles of risk-neutral pricing.
That is, the market valuation method reflects the fact that bad outcomes tend to coincide with times when
losses are particularly painful. The valuation we perform also reflects the fact that PBGC insurance is triggered
only in the case of bankruptcy by drawing on the default probabilities implied by the credit ratings of insured
plans. Under the baseline parameters, the PBGC’s insurance of the unfunded liabilities has a financial value of
$358 billion, net of the estimated present value of PBGC premiums.
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Executive Summary
In this paper, we use financial valuation techniques to measure the un-
funded liabilities associated with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-
ration (PBGC)  single- employer pension insurance program. This is an 
alternative approach to the calculations of expected future PBGC pay-
outs in the PBGC exposure reports. The PBGC insurance is akin to an 
exchange option, a financial instrument that allows a party to exchange 
one risky asset for another. Calculating the value of this option for each 
PBGC- covered plan provides a measure of the fair market price of the 
PBGC guarantee that is consistent with the finance principles of risk- 
neutral pricing. That is, the market valuation method reflects the fact 
that bad outcomes tend to coincide with times when losses are particu-
larly painful. The valuation we perform also reflects the fact that PBGC 
insurance is triggered only in the case of bankruptcy by drawing on 
the default probabilities implied by the credit ratings of insured plans. 
Under the baseline parameters, the PBGC’s insurance of the unfunded 
liabilities has a financial value of $358 billion, net of the estimated pres-
ent value of PBGC premiums.
I. Introduction
It has long been recognized that the pricing of PBGC insurance can be 
viewed as a financial option (Sharpe 1976; Merton 1977; Treynor 1977). 
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Firms in bankruptcy have the right to put their pension liabilities and 
assets to the PBGC, with the PBGC’s remaining claim on the firm hav-
ing the priority of an unsecured creditor. Following this recognition, 
there have been several empirical attempts to use options pricing mod-
els to price these guarantees on a plan- by- plan basis (Marcus 1987; Pen-
nachi and Lewis 1994; Kiska, Lucas, and Phaup 2005).
One key challenge in applying option pricing techniques to value 
PBGC insurance is modeling bankruptcy. The existing options pricing 
techniques have modeled the sponsoring firm assets as well as the pen-
sion fund assets as a stochastic process. That is, they have specified how 
the sponsoring firm’s operating assets and liabilities would grow if its 
returns followed lognormal distributions. Those assumptions, however, 
are often inconsistent with data in the market. Credit spreads on corpo-
rate debt of different maturities contain information about the premium 
that market participants must receive in order to hold corporate bonds. 
This premium depends on the probability of default (or bankruptcy), 
the market’s estimation of the extent of debt recovery in default, and 
the state of the world in which bankruptcy of the firm is likely to occur.
A second important challenge is specifying the growth rate of liabili-
ties, and the rates at which assets grow due to contributions and benefit 
payments. The previous literature has simply assumed a given baseline 
level of growth of pension benefits. The available plan- level data, how-
ever, provide information about the rates at which benefits are paid 
and new benefits accrue, relative to liabilities, for each plan. The data 
also provide information about the contribution rate and rate at which 
benefits are paid, relative to assets, for each plan.
In a sample of pension plans that represent 90% of the universe of 
 single- employer defined benefit (DB) pension liabilities in the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) 5500 filings, we first reevaluate the current un-
funded liabilities of plans covered by the PBGC using Treasury discount 
rates. We then use the concept of an exchange option, which allows one 
party to exchange one risky asset for another, to apply a risk- neutral 
pricing methodology and derive the value of PBGC insurance. From 
a taxpayer perspective, this value can be seen as the dollar equivalent 
that one would have to pay to a private insurance company to receive 
nondefaultable guarantees (Brown 2008). In contrast to options pric-
ing approaches in the past literature, our valuation of the PBGC insur-
ance is consistent with each plan’s  market- implied default probability, 
as well as plan level data on each plan’s actual accrual rates of new 
benefits.
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The approach we take is different from that in the PBGC exposure 
reports, which are based on the Pension Insurance Modeling System 
(PIMS) model. The financial valuation we perform measures the mar-
ket value of expected future payoffs. That is, it provides an estimate 
of what a very large financial market participant or very large insurer 
might have to be paid to take over the entire liability from the PBGC. 
The PIMS model does not actually value future payoffs, but rather cal-
culates expected future payoffs. Taking expected values is not a valu-
ation of the future payoffs, since it ignores the fact that liabilities are 
likely to come in states of the world where the marginal value of a dol-
lar is high. The two methods therefore answer different questions: the 
calculations we produce here give a financial valuation of the liability 
as opposed to a measure of expected future payouts.
Even though officially the PBGC is, by statute, supposed to be self- 
financing and therefore does not officially receive the full backing of the 
US government (Brown 2008), most observers start with the assump-
tion that the US Congress will not let the PBGC fail. This will be the 
maintained assumption in this paper when we compute the liability of 
the PBGC to the US taxpayer. 
II. Methodology
Methods such as those in the PIMS exposure report that consider the 
expected value of future PBGC payouts tell us the average payouts over 
all states of the world. However, the expected value of future PBGC 
payouts does not reflect the present value of unfunded government li-
abilities. That is because a present value of PBGC payouts does not take 
into account state pricing. The payouts that the government will have 
to make are likely to come in situations, or states of the world, where 
funds are scarce and the shadow cost of a dollar is high. That means 
that a financial market participant or an insurance company would 
have to be paid more than the simple average payout to take over the 
insurance from the government.
To take a very simple example, consider a stock market currently val-
ued at $100 with only two states of the world: an “up” state where the 
market returns $126 (a positive return of 26%) or a “down” state where 
the market returns $86 (a negative return of 14%), each of which occur 
with a probability of 50%. This stock market has a market risk premium 
of 0.5*26% + 0.5*(–14%) = 6%, not far from what surveys of professional 
economists and chief financial officers (CFOs) today believe that the 
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market risk premium should be (Graham and Harvey 2013) and a vola-
tility of 20%. There is a risk- free rate of rf = 0.
Now consider a world with a zero interest rate with an  option- like 
derivative contract that pays $100*max(0,–rm), that is, in finance this is 
what is called an at- the- money put on the market, because the strike 
price of the option equals the current value. The payoff of the option in 
the up state would be $0, and the payoff in the down state would be 
$14. If we took the expected payoff of this option, it would be 0.5*0 + 
(1 – 0.5)*$14 = $7.
However, this expected payoff far understates the value of the op-
tion. If this option were to only cost $7, an individual could earn arbi-
trage profits through the correct combination of borrowing and invest-
ing in the asset and in the option. Suppose that one borrows $44.10 and 
uses the proceeds to invest $35 in the stock market, buy the option for 
$7, and invest the remainder of $2.10 in the risk- free rate. If the up state 
realizes, the stock market investment is worth $35*1.26 = $44.10 that 
can be used to pay back the loan (recall that the interest rate is zero), 
the option is worthless and one can walk away with a profit of $2.10. 
If the down state realizes, the stock market investment is worth $30.10, 
the option pays off $14, for a total of $44.10 which again can be used to 
pay off the loan, and allows the investor to walk away with a profit of 
$2.10. That is, a risk- free profit of $2.10 can now be made. This example 
illustrates that the option price of $7 is $2.10 too cheap. If the option 
price had been $7 + $2.10 = $9.10, no arbitrage profits could be made 
from this investment strategy.
To formalize this, from Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979), we know 
that the price of the option in this binomial world can be calculated as:
 
 
1
1 + r
r − d
u − d( ) * 0 + u − ru − d( ) * 14  (1)
where r is the risk- free rate, u is the return in the up state, and d is the 
return in the down state. For r = 0, u = +26%, and d = –14%, this formula 
indeed leads to a value of the option equal to $9.10, or around 30% 
higher than the expected value of the payoffs. The terms  (r − d) / (u − d) 
and  (u − r) / (u − d) are known as the risk- neutral probabilities of the 
up and down state.
The above method stands in contrast to the PBGC PIMS approach in 
which assets are projected forward at expected returns and then dis-
counted back at risk- free rates. Specifically, the 2012 annual exposure 
report states:
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Throughout this report, we express all future outcomes in present value terms (i.e., 
discounted back to 2012). Each scenario’s outcomes are discounted based on the 
30- year Treasury bond yields projected for that scenario, regardless of whether the 
underlying simulated cash flows are generated from holdings of equities, high- 
yield bonds, corporate bonds, or US Treasury bonds. (exposure report, page 15)
For an actual financial valuation, the PBGC would have to project for-
ward scenarios based on the risk- neutral distribution of return out-
comes. The mean of that distribution is the risk- free rate. One approach 
to obtaining a financial valuation would therefore be to project forward 
the assets not at their expected return but rather at a risk- free rate.
We take an approach here that in essence does just that, but also re-
flects that the PBGC insurance is an exchange option. Exchange options, 
also known as outperformance options, pay off only if the underlying 
asset outperforms some other asset (McDonald 2003). In the case of a 
pension system, the idea is that the PBGC insurance only has value in 
states of the world where the stochastically evolving liabilities exceed 
the stochastically evolving assets. The PBGC is giving firms the option 
to put their assets in exchange for the defeasance value of the liabilities.1
Let the assets of the pension plan be denoted by At and the liabilities 
by Lt. Assets are influenced by investment choices of the plan as well as 
inflows from the plan sponsor and outflows to pension holders. Liabili-
ties are influenced by interest rate fluctuations, demographic changes, 
indexation rules, and so forth. Further, let the funding ratio be given by:
  
 
t =
At
Lt
 (2)
As a simplistic starting point, assume that the annual log volatility 
of the growth of assets of the pension plan is given by σA, and that 
the volatility of the log growth of liabilities is given by σL. Further, let the 
correlation between the assets and the volatilities be given by ρAL. The 
volatility of the log funding ratio is then given by:
   = A
2 + L2 − 2ALAL  (3)
So if the pension plan could fully hedge changes in liabilities by appro-
priately choosing their investment policy, then σ = 0.
A. A Simplified Example: Random Default and Proportional Insurance
Now suppose that a firm defaults with a default intensity λ, that default 
is unrelated to fluctuations in the  asset- liability ratio 
 
t, that the firm’s 
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pension liabilities are fixed, and that new benefits accrue outside the 
pension plan. We will relax these assumptions in a moment. Further 
assume that the PBGC’s insurance only kicks in when the asset liability 
ratio is below a fraction K total liabilities. So if assets are 80% of liabili-
ties and K = 0.9, then the PBGC is only on the hook for 10% of the liabil-
ities. This is to represent the fact that the PBGC is only liable for pension 
promises up to a certain annual cap. In 2013 the cap was $57,477 per 
year for a 65- year- old retiree. The covered amount is higher for older 
retirees, but lower for those who retire early or choose survivor benefits. 
In that case, the Black- Scholes value of the put option the PBGC has 
implicitly written on the firm’s pension liabilities (as a fraction of the 
total liabilities) is equal to:
 
 
VPBGC =
t
∞
∫ f , s( ) p s( ) ds, (4)
where:
  p s( ) = e
−r s − t( )KN −d2( ) − tN −d1( )  
 
 
d1 =
ln t
K( ) + r + 
2
2( ) s − t( )
 s − t
 (5)
  d2 = d1 −  s − t  
The function 
 
f , s( ) describes the risk- neutral probability of defaulting 
at time s. We use credit spread data by credit rating to calibrate firm- 
specific risk- neutral default probabilities by horizon. We assume that 
the sponsor’s default is uncorrelated with the evolution of the funding 
ratio. In practice, default is more likely in bad economic times when 
stock markets perform poorly and interest rates are low. An analysis 
that accounted for this would raise the value of the insurance above the 
values that we report. As such, our estimates are conservative.
B. Exchange Option
One only needs to reexpress the above formulas to derive the price of 
the exchange option. Multiplying p(s) by Lt (i.e., switching back to dol-
lars for the numeraire), and recognizing  Ft,t + s
L = Lt / Bt,t + s and 
 Ft,t + s
A = At / Bt,t + s are the s- period ahead forward prices of  Lt and  At, 
respectively, we have that
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  p s
( ) = Bt,t + s KFt,t + sL N −d2( ) − Ft,t + sA N −d1( )[ ] 
 
 
d1 =
lnFt,t + sA − ln KFt,t + sL( ) + 
2
2
s − t( )
 s − t
 (6)
  d2 = d1 −  s − t,  
where  Bt,t + s is the time t price of a dollar that is paid out at time t + s, and 
where we have implicitly assumed that the natural growth rates of as-
sets and liabilities are the same under the risk- neutral measure. This 
formulation is also much more general. It applies to the case with sto-
chastic liabilities, new contributions, new benefit accruals, and benefit 
payments made out of plan assets, provided the forward prices of the 
assets and the liabilities account for the inflows and outflows resulting 
from contributions, new accruals, and payments made to retirees.
The current market value of the liabilities’ defeasance portfolio (Lt) 
is obviously an important input to the pricing model. Current rules do 
not, however, require plans to report this number, or even their forecasts 
of the annual benefits they expect to pay. We must infer this number, 
therefore, from what plans do report, a summary discounted “value” of 
these liabilities, and the capitalization rate (the “effective interest rate”) 
that they employ in this calculation. We calculate the market value of 
the defeasance portfolio for the pension promises (a portfolio of trea-
suries that have the same cash flows) by “undiscounting” the reported 
pension liability at the reported effective discount rate, and rediscount-
ing at Treasury rates. Doing so requires an assumption regarding the 
duration of plans’ pension liabilities, and we consider three possible 
scenarios: a baseline assumption of 15 years, which is a number typi-
cally assumed in the pension industry, and low and high scenarios as-
suming 12 and 18 year liability durations, respectively.
In summary, to implement the  exchange- options framework de-
scribed above we need the following set of inputs: the current value of 
the liabilities, the current value of the assets, the probability of default 
by horizon adjusted for the comovement with the economy (also called 
the risk- neutral probability of default), the volatility of assets and li-
abilities, as well as their correlation.
C. Sample
The universe of plans on the Employee Benefits Security Administra-
tion (EBSA) plan data website was downloaded for years 2010 and 
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2011. To obtain the sample, we sorted the plans from largest to smallest 
total liabilities as of the year 2010, and included the largest plans by 
total liabilities, so that 90% of total liabilities were included. This leads 
to a sample of 1,601 plans. This sample was selected to avoid having 
to clean the entire IRS 5500 database of plans. If the plans representing 
the remaining 10% of liabilities are similar to the remaining plans, then 
the results for the universe can be obtained by dividing the results for the 
sample by 0.9.
D. Implementation and Discussion
There are two particular papers in previous literature that are similar to 
our approach. Marcus (1987) essentially considers the PBGC’s liability 
as that of a long position in a forward contract on the pension fund 
assets, with an exercise price equal to fund liabilities and a stochastic 
maturity date. In that exercise, the PBGC still obtains the surplus in an 
overfunded plan. The firm’s debt and value evolve according to sto-
chastic equations of motion, and when the value of the debt falls below 
the value of the assets, bankruptcy is triggered. Pennachi and Lewis 
(1994) tackle the fact that in practice, the PBGC does not access over-
funded plan assets by using put option pricing, but continues to use 
stochastic equations of motion for firm debt and firm assets to model 
bankruptcy. These papers also make parametric assumptions about 
benefit accrual and contributions.
The major departures we take from this literature are twofold. First, 
we calibrate benefit accruals and contributions directly to plan- level 
information. We assume that for the next 10 years the rates at which 
benefits are paid and new benefits accrue, relative to liabilities, and 
that the contribution rate and rate at which benefits are paid, relative 
to assets, are the firm- specific values we observe in the data. We as-
sume that beyond 10 years these rates revert to the observed  cross- 
 sectional mean. 
Second, we use the default rates that are implied by the credit rat-
ings of the plans in question. To perform this step, we first collected 
credit ratings for all of the plans that we could match to the Compu-
stat annual file on publicly traded firms by name or employer iden-
tification number (EIN). This resulted in ratings for 768 of the 1,601 
firms. We assigned numerical ratings categories of 1 for AAA, 2 for 
AA+, 3 for AA, and so on. For those firms we ran the following re-
gression:
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Numerical † Rating =∝ + 1
Retired
Active
+ 2
Assets
Liabilities
+ 3 ln Liabilities( ) + 
 (7)
for which complete information on the explanatory variables were 
available for 768 firms. For the remaining firms, we assigned imputed 
values based on the coefficients in this regression, all of which were 
statistically significant at the 5% level at least.2 
Figure 1 shows the distributions of credit ratings in both the sample 
of plans sponsored by rated firms and in the complete sample that in-
cludes all imputations. The top figure shows counts, where the total 
count of the plans sponsored by rated firms amounts to 768, and the 
total count of all rated and sponsored firms is 1,600.3 The bottom figure 
shows the frequency distribution of the credit ratings, both the actual 
ratings of the rated firms and in the full sample that includes the im-
putations. From this figure it can be seen that much of the mass of the 
plans actually belonging to rated sponsors is in the BBB– to A range. 
The imputation adds the most firms to the BBB, BBB–, and BB+ brackets 
of the histogram.
For each rating class, we have collected recent data on credit spreads. 
Using imputed credit ratings for each firm, we can then use the credit 
spreads to uncover the risk- neutral intensity of default. Let  csi denote the 
credit spread for rating category i, and let 
 
 i denote the recovery rate of 
rating category I; then the average default intensity 
 
i is simply given by:
 
 
i =
csi
1 −  i
 (8)
As we discussed above, the PIMS model projects assets forward at 
expected returns and discounts the net position back at risk- free rate, 
to measure today’s expectation of the future surplus. A modification to 
the PIMS model that would make it more analogous to the option meth-
odology would be instead to project assets forward using the risk- free 
rate as the asset’s expected growth rate, but maintaining the weights 
on the different possible outcomes. This is equivalent to projecting as-
set growth using its actual expected rate of return, but reducing the 
weights of the good outcomes and increasing the weights on the bad 
outcomes, that is, using the risk- neutral probabilities rather than the 
objective probabilities for the outcomes. 
The options pricing techniques are derived from the Black- Scholes 
options pricing formula. The basic underlying assumption here is that 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of credit ratings
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liabilities could be defeased, or matched, using different combinations of 
marketable securities. Our analysis treats the replicating portfolio of the 
liabilities, the constituent pieces of which are traded, as the liabilities. 
As such, the risk- neutral natural growth rate of liabilities is the risk- 
 free rate.
The variances and correlations between each of the asset classes are 
computed using monthly return data between March 2000 and Decem-
ber 2012. For stocks we use dollar denominated returns on the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world index. For bonds, we use 
zero coupon bond returns with a constant maturity of 10 years. For real 
estate, we use changes in the Case Shiller house price index. We then 
annualize these estimates to arrive at the actual parameters we use in 
our simulations. 
By using firm- specific data on portfolio holdings and combining 
these with the  variance- covariance matrix of the asset classes, we can 
compute the volatility of assets as well as the correlation between assets 
and liabilities. The portfolio holdings data for the pension plans come 
from the 10- K filings of the publicly traded companies in our sample, 
which we match by hand to the IRS 5500 filings in the sample by em-
ployer identification number (EIN) and where applicable by name. This 
matching covers only 40% of the sample. Where plans are not matched 
to the 10- Ks, specifically in the instance of the plans of privately held 
companies, we use the sample average.
The dynamics of liabilities are mostly driven by variation in long- 
term interest rates. As such, long- term bonds are the best hedge against 
fluctuations in the liabilities. Put differently, the risk- free asset for a pen-
sion plan is long- term bonds, not cash. If long- term bonds and stocks 
are highly positively correlated, stocks are a good hedge against liabil-
ity risk. If long- term bonds and stocks have a low (or even a negative) 
correlation, stocks are a poor liability hedge. Unfortunately, the latter is 
what is suggested by the data. In our simulations, a plan that chooses 
to invest heavily in stocks will have a poor hedge against liability risk, 
which increases the volatility of the funding ratio and makes the PBGC 
put more valuable to the plan, and more costly to the PBGC.
Table 1 shows the parameters we use in the model. These param-
eters are: the volatilities of stocks, bonds, and real estate; the correla-
tions among these different asset classes; the duration of the liabilities; 
and the percent of liabilities covered by the PBGC insurance. Note that 
with precise enough data about plan liabilities, it would be possible to 
calculate precise durations for each plan, as well as relatively accurate 
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Table 1
Model Ingredients
Parameter  Baseline (Scenarios)
σ(equity) 16.6%
σ(10yr bond) 10.2%
σ(real estate) 3.9% (alternative: σ(equity))
ρ(10yr bond, equity) –0.317 (alternative: 0)
ρ(real estate, equity) 0.090
ρ(real estate, 10yr bond) 0.003
Duration of liabilities 15 years (12 years, 18 years)
% of Liabilities covered  90% (80%, 100%)
Note: All bonds referred to here are zero coupon.
Table 2
Sample Summary Statistics (2010/2011), N = 1,601 Plans
Variable  Mean Median Standard Deviation
Liabilities ($ billions) 1.083 0.426 2.727
Assets ($ billions) 1.096 0.415 2.818
Effective interest rate 6.9% 7.0% 0.4%
Benefits / Assets 0.064 0.064 0.031
Benefits / Liabilities 0.060 0.061 0.030
Normal cost / Liabilities 0.027  0.027  0.021
Note: Values for 2011 are used when available (88% of the sample), else values 
for 2010.
estimates of the percent of each plan’s liabilities covered by the PBGC. 
Table 2 shows several summary statistics for 1,601 plans in our sample.
III. Results
Table 3 shows the results of adjusting pension liabilities reported by 
the plans themselves on the IRS 5500 filings to reflect their value as 
 default- free government promises. When plans are taken over by the 
government, they effectively become  default- free government obliga-
tions, and as such, it is important to understand the value of total liabili-
ties as a preface to measuring the PBGC insurance value.
Panel A of table 3 presents the present values. The total liability in 
the sample at the segment rates is $1.736 trillion. Dividing that total 
by 0.9 results in the estimated total universe liability of $1.929 trillion. 
But plans calculate these liabilities using the IRS segments rates, the 
averages of which are presented in panel B for 2010 and 2011. The seg-
ment rates are based on averages of corporate bonds for  short- term, 
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 medium- term, and long- term maturities. These segment rates are well 
above the yields on Treasury bonds in panel C.
We infer the zero coupon yield curve from the more easily obtainable 
coupon bond yields. Specifically, we employ the par yield curve for 
July 15, 2013, provided by the US Department of the Treasury. We get a 
complete set of zero coupon bond yields from zero coupon bond prices, 
which we get by stripping the par bonds.4 By using government bond 
yields as the risk- free asset, we are ignoring the so- called liquidity pre-
mium (for example, because government bonds are used as collateral in 
many transactions), which could make those government yields lower 
than the “true” yields. Given that this effect is generally small, this 
should not have a large effect on our results.
If the liabilities have a duration of 12 years, then moving from cor-
porate segment rate discounting to zero coupon Treasury discounting 
Table 3
Adjusting Pension Liabilities to Treasury Discount Rates
Panel A: Pension Liability Under Different Yield Curves, $ trillions
Rate  Duration  
Total Liability 
(Sample)  
Total Liability 
(Universe)  
Total Funding 
Status (Universe)
Segment rates  
(Stated in 5500s) NA  $1.736  $1.929  0.020
Treasury 12yr $2.611 $2.901 –0.952
Treasury 15yr $2.893 $3.215 –1.266
Treasury  18yr  $3.205  $3.561  –1.612
Panel B: Average Segment Rates Employed by Sample Plans
1st Segment 2nd Segment 3rd Segment Overall Effective 
  <5 years  5- 20 years  >20 years  Interest Rate
2010 4.77 6.66 6.77 6.59
2011  3.87  6.19  7.54  6.18
Panel C: Treasury Yield Curve, July 2013
Maturity 1 2 3 5 7 10 20 30 
Par yield 0.11 0.34 0.66 1.40 1.97 2.57 3.30 3.61
Notes: Total sample assets are $1.754 trillion, which if representing 90% of the sample 
would imply total  single- employer universe assets of $1.949 trillion. Panel A shows the 
total pension liability for the 90% sample and the estimate of the universe (sample value 
/ 0.9) both as stated in the IRS 5500 filings and under Treasury yields of different dura-
tion. Panel B shows the average segment rates employed by the plans in calculating their 
stated liabilities. Panel C shows the par Treasury yield curve from which the zero coupon 
yields in Panel A are calculated.
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raises the total estimated universe liability by 50%, from $1.929 trillion 
to $2.901 trillion. If liabilities have a duration of 15 years, then the in-
crease is by 67%, from $1.929 trillion to $3.215 trillion. For a duration of 
18 years, the total liability is $3.561 trillion, an increase of 84%.
The average effective annual interest rate employed by the plans 
when calculating their reported liability is 6.6%, roughly twice as high as 
the Treasury rate. Assuming a duration of 12 or 18 years thus lowers or 
raises the market value of the defeasance portfolio by around 10%, rela-
tive to a duration of 15 years.5 PBGC issuance is a put on plan liabilities.
Under the baseline assumption that liabilities have a duration of 15 
years, the universe unfunded liability would be $3.215 trillion liabili-
ties – $1.949 trillion assets = $1.27 trillion.6
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present our main results on the value of the PBGC 
insurance on these unfunded liabilities, using the options pricing tech-
niques under  market- consistent assumptions about default likelihoods. 
These tables show the insurance value of PBGC liabilities in the sample, 
Table 4
Insurance Value of PBGC Liabilities ($ billions) Directly from Model
Liability Duration
ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0 12 Years 15 Years 18 Years
80% Cap
κ = 0.50 $123.5 $200.3 $301.5
κ = 0.65 $152.0 $244.8 $365.3
κ = 0.80 $197.1 $314.2 $462.6
90% Cap
κ = 0.50 $186.7 $282.5 $404.0
κ = 0.65 $230.7 $346.2 $490.6
κ = 0.80 $302.2 $447.2 $624.4
Full Insurance
κ = 0.50 $259.7 $373.7 $514.8
κ = 0.65 $321.6 $458.5 $625.7
κ = 0.80  $422.7  $593.7  $797.9
Notes: This table shows the insurance value of the PBGC liabilities using the 
exchange option methodology with  ratings- specific default probabilities, 
under a variety of different parameters. Cap represents the percentage of 
total liabilities that are covered, that is, below the PBGC maximum pension 
limits. The parameter κ is the recovery rate that we assume on the corporate 
bonds when calculating the implied risk- neutral default probability. Given 
a level of the credit spread, a higher recovery rate implies a higher risk- 
neutral probability of default. The correlation between stocks and bonds 
is set to the baseline value of 0. The asset volatility is set to the estimated 
value for each plan. The baseline scenario is highlighted.
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ignoring the fact that the sample represents only 90% of the universe, 
and also ignoring PBGC premiums. The baseline scenario uses the fol-
lowing five assumptions: (1) the correlation between stocks and bonds 
is zero; (2) the recovery value on corporate bonds is 65%, based on the 
 value- weighted average recovery rate on senior secured debt published 
by Moody’s (Moody’s (2008)); (3) the asset volatility for each plan is 
equal to the historical asset volatility inferred from the plans’ portfo-
lio choices; ( 4) 90% of total liabilities are covered by the PBGC, which 
is based on the four largest terminations in the PBGC history, where 
87% of liabilities recovered; and (5) the duration of the pension liabil-
ity is assumed to be 15 years. In this scenario, which is highlighted in 
the box, the insurance value of the PBGC’s position is $346.2 billion. 
Note again that this is before we account for the present value of the 
 single- employer premiums to the PBGC, which we do below.
Our numbers are most similar to those of Kiska, Lucas, and Phaup 
(2005), who also use a risk- neutral framework to calculate the market 
value of the PBGC guarantee. They analyze a stripped down version of 
the PIMS model employed by the PBGC, simulating possible paths for 
the value of a firm’s assets and liabilities, for both its pension and its 
operations. They estimate a market value PBGC insurance to nontermi-
nated plans of $118.6 billion. At that time the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) estimated that total official liabilities of all covered  defined- benefit 
plans on a termination basis were $1.638 trillion, covered by $1.269 tril-
lion in assets, for an unfunded liability of $369 billion. This implies that 
the value of the insurance was 7% of the insured liabilities, or 32% of 
the unfunded liability.7 These numbers are roughly consistent with the 
11% of current insured liabilities, or 28% of unfunded liabilities, in our 
baseline calculations.8 Kiska, Lucas, and Phaup (2005) employ numbers 
from more than 10 years ago, a decade over which the corporate sector 
has experienced enormous stress. Their analysis also does not use the 
information about the risk- neutral term structure of default probabilities 
in corporate bond yields, relying instead on a structural default model. 
The figure below the $346.2 billion number shows what happens if we 
instead assume a recovery rate of 80% on corporate bonds. The reason 
this affects the results is that for a given credit spread, a higher recovery 
value implies a higher risk- neutral probability of default. Therefore, the 
insurance value increases to $447.2 billion under this higher recovery 
assumption for corporate bonds. Conversely, assuming a recovery rate 
of 50% would lower the estimated insurance value to $282.5 billion.
The left and right columns of the table show what happens if the du-
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ration of the liabilities is shorter or longer than 15 years. The assumed 
duration of the liabilities has a large effect on the value of PBGC insur-
ance, because it has a direct material impact on the true funding status 
of the covered plans, as shown previously in table 3. PBGC issuance is 
a put on plan liabilities. 
The model reducing the duration to 12 years reduces the value of the 
PBGC insurance by 33%, from $346.2 billion to $230.7 billion. Increasing 
the duration to 18 years raises the value of the PBGC insurance by 42%, 
from $346.2 billion to $490.6 billion. Due to convexity, the increase in the 
value (cost to taxpayers) is greater if duration is made longer than the 
decrease in value if the duration is made shorter. Increasing the dura-
tion of the liabilities increases the value of the option for two reasons. 
First, because the adjusted level of the liabilities is lower, the option is 
therefore further into the money. Secondly, the volatility of the liabilities 
goes up as the duration increases. As option values are increasing in the 
volatility of the underlying, this also increases the value of the option. 
As noted previously, if plan- by- plan information were available on 
the duration of liabilities, these calculations could be done more exactly, 
without having to make a parametric assumption about the duration of 
liabilities that applies to the entire sample. 
The other parameter for which we test several values in the table is 
the PBGC cap, which can be thought of as the strike price of the op-
tion. The PBGC cap is our term for the percentage of plan liabilities 
that are covered by the PBGC. Uncovered liabilities are the portion of 
pension payments that are above the annual yearly pension coverage 
maximums. Again, with sufficient plan- by- plan data, this assumption 
would not have to be uniform for the entire sample. 
The results in the table suggest that if the other parameters are fixed 
at their baseline, then if the coverage were uncapped, the financial pres-
ent value cost of PBGC insurance would be 32% higher than it would be 
under the baseline ($458.5 billion in the full insurance scenario versus 
$346.2 billion under the baseline of a 90% cap).
Table 5 examines the sensitivity of the results to different assumptions 
about the correlation between  equity- like financial instruments and 
long- term bonds. The baseline assumption used throughout table 4, 
and also in the middle row of each panel of table 5, is a zero correla-
tion. However, as discussed in the previous section, the historical data 
point to a negative correlation between equity returns and the changes 
in value on bonds or other fixed streams of payments, including pen-
sion liabilities. If that is the case, then the stock investments undertaken 
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by firms are actually a negative hedge against the value of the liabilities. 
That is, exactly in the states of the world where the  equity- type assets 
in the pension funds are down, the promised cash flows are the most 
expensive to meet. On the other hand, the literature has provided evi-
dence that the correlation between stocks and bonds is time varying. 
We therefore also consider a scenario where the correlation between 
stocks and bonds would be positive going forward.
Reducing the correlation between stocks and bonds from zero to 
–0.3 raises the value of the PBGC insurance, because the states of the 
world where sponsor equity investments perform poorly are exactly 
the same states of the world where it is particularly expensive to meet 
the liability. Without this correlation, the value of the PBGC insurance 
is the baseline value of $346.2 billion, but with the negative correla-
tion, the value is $373.0 billion. In other words, if there is a negative 
correlation between stock returns and bond returns, then the increased 
 asset- liability mismatch would add around 8% to the value of the PB-
GC’s insurance position.
Table 5
Insurance Value of PBGC Liabilities ($ billions) Directly from Model
Liability Duration
κ = 0.65  12 Years  15 Years  18 Years
80% Cap
ρ(stocks,bonds) = –0.3 $169.7 $269.7 $396.6
ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0 $152.0 $244.8 $365.3
ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0.3 $133.5 $218.3 $331.6
90% Cap
ρ(stocks,bonds) = –0.3 $250.3 $373.0 $523.8
ρ(stocks,bonds)= 0 $230.7 $346.2 $490.6
ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0.3 $210.2 $317.7 $454.9
Full Insurance
ρ(stocks,bonds) = –0.3 $342.5 $486.7 $660.2
ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0 $321.6 $458.5 $625.7
ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0.3  $299.7  $428.6  $588.7
Notes: This table shows the insurance value of the PBGC liabilities using the 
exchange option methodology with  ratings- specific default probabilities, 
under a variety of different parameters. Cap represents the percentage of 
total liabilities that are covered, that is, below the PBGC maximum pension 
limits. ρ(stocks,bonds) represents the correlation between the returns on US 
stocks and 10- year bonds, which historically has been –0.3. The recovery 
rate κ is set to the baseline value of 0.65. The asset volatility is set to the 
estimated value for each plan. The baseline scenario is highlighted.
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In table 6 we perform a general robustness analysis with respect to 
the total volatility of plans’ funding ratios. We consider two scenarios 
in addition to the baseline. The first additional scenario reduces the esti-
mated volatility of each plan’s funding ratio (the ratio of assets and lia-
bilities) by 30%. The second additional scenario raises the estimated vol-
atility of each plan’s funding ratio by 30%. We perform this robustness 
in part as a reduced way of accounting for the possibility that contribu-
tions to the plan are higher when the plan is more underfunded, and 
lower when the plan is overfunded.9 Such  funding- status- dependent 
contributions will lower the total volatility of the funding ratio. Relative 
to our baseline scenario, lowering the volatility decreases the insurance 
value from $346.2 billion to $295.5 billion, a change of –15%.
Table 7 adjusts the numbers in table 4 to reflect the fact that the sample 
represents only 90% of the universe, by dividing the figures in table 4 by 
0.9. It also subtracts $27 billion as the present value of PBGC premiums 
from each number. We emphasize that this is only a very rough and 
preliminary way of incorporating PBGC premiums, based on the figures 
on page 10 of the 2012 PBGC exposure report, where single employer 
Table 6
Insurance Value of PBGC Liabilities ($ billions) Directly from Model
Liability Duration
κ = 0.65, ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0 12 Years 15 Years 18 Years
80% Cap
0.7 σ $119.4 $197.7 $300.5
σ $152.0 $244.8 $365.3
1.3 σ $192.3 $301.3 $440.5
90% Cap
0.7 σ $194.4 $295.5 $422.1
σ $230.7 $346.2 $490.6
1.3 σ $275.2 $406.9 $570.2
Full Insurance
0.7 σ $283.0 $405.5 $554.8
σ $321.6 $458.5 $625.7
1.3 σ  $369.0  $522.3  $708.5
Notes: This table shows the insurance value of the PBGC liabilities using the 
exchange option methodology with  ratings- specific default probabilities, un-
der a variety of different parameters. Cap represents the percentage of total 
liabilities that are covered, that is, below the PBGC maximum pension limits. 
We investigate the sensitivity with respect to the total volatility of the funding 
ratio for a range of 30% above and below the estimated values. The baseline 
scenario is highlighted.
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premiums have a present value of $27 billion at the mean. This does not 
take into account the possibility that premiums might be higher in worst 
states of the world conditional on firms not being bankrupt, but lower in 
the worst states of the world in which firms are actually bankrupt. Ac-
cording to the PBGC exposure report, premiums would be $19 billion at 
the 15th percentile, and $36 billion at the 85th percentile.
The central number in table 7, a PBGC insurance value net of premi-
ums of $357.7 billion, represents our main estimate mentioned in the 
executive summary.
IV. Conclusions
Under almost all scenarios, we find that the financial market value of the 
PBGC insurance is higher than the present value of expected payouts 
provided in the PBGC exposure report. For example, over a 10- year hori-
zon, the PBGC exposure report finds a present value mean of $32.5 billion 
(the average present value of FY 2022 future outcomes) and a median 
of $29.9 billion, whereas the financial valuations are in the hundreds of 
billions of dollars. Using our baseline parameters, the unfunded liability 
net of premiums is $357.7 billion, assuming that liabilities have a 15- year 
duration and exactly 90% of liabilities are covered. We note that our esti-
mate is also conservative in that we do not incorporate the PBGC’s exist-
ing obligations or assets from terminations that have already occurred.
Table 7
Insurance Value of PBGC Liabilities ($ billions) with Adjustments for 
Sample and Premiums
Liability Duration
  12 Years  15 Years  18 Years
80% Cap
κ = 0.65 $141.9 $245.0 $378.9
90% Cap
κ = 0.65 $229.3 $357.7 $518.1
Full Insurance
κ = 0.65  $330.3  $482.4  $668.2
Notes: This table shows the insurance value of the PBGC liabilities us-
ing the exchange option methodology with  ratings- specific default 
probabilities, under a variety of different parameters. The figures 
are based on table 3 but with corrections for the fact that the original 
sample covered only 90% of total liabilities, and for PBGC premiums, 
for which we assume a 2012 present value of $27 billion. The baseline 
scenario is highlighted.
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The PBGC calculations project forward assets using the objective dis-
tribution of outcomes and discount them back at the risk- free rate. This 
procedure is not a financial valuation, because it does not reflect the fact 
that the worst outcomes come in the most expensive states of the world. 
Indeed, if assets could always be projected forward using the actual (or 
objective) distribution of outcomes, and discounted back to the pres-
ent at risk- free rates, financial value could be created out of nowhere 
simply by investing in risky assets. 
There are several aspects of our analysis where further research is 
needed to improve the calculations. First, we included no state pricing 
in the PBGC premiums. The financial value of the future stream of cash 
Fig. 2. Year by year discounted risk- neutral expected payouts
Notes: This graph shows the discounted risk- neutral expected payoffs by year, to illustrate 
the distribution over years of the PBGC’s unfunded liabilities. Baseline parameters were 
used: ρ(stocks,bonds) = 0, κ = 0.65, 90% cap. Premiums are not included, and the values 
in the graph reflect sample values (90% of the universe of total liabilities). The line was 
smoothed using 10- year moving averages.
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flows from these premiums may well be less than $25 billion due to 
the fact that premiums are likely to be lower in exactly the states of the 
world where the funding status of the plans is weakened and where 
bankruptcy is more likely. Second, having plan- by- plan information 
on the duration of liabilities and the percent of PBGC liabilities covered 
would allow more precise plan- by- plan estimates and avoid the need 
for parametric assumptions on the entire sample.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are critical correlations 
that the  closed- form solution approach is unable to model. Most impor-
tantly, we have assumed that the evolution of the funding ratio and the 
default event are uncorrelated. However, in bad economic times, such 
as the recent financial crisis, plan defaults becomes more likely, inter-
est rates are likely to drop leading to higher levels of the liabilities, and 
stock markets lose a substantial fraction of their value. This type of cor-
relation can lead to a substantially higher value of the PBGC’s insurance. 
The fact that these correlations are almost certainly present in the 
underlying economics of the pension plans, but are not modeled in our 
exercise, strongly suggests that our figures here are a lower bound on 
the present value of the PBGC’s unfunded liabilities. To model the cor-
relations would require simulation (Monte Carlo) analysis, done in such 
a way as to be consistent with the principles of options pricing. Specifi-
cally, the Monte Carlo would require the projection of assets forward at 
the risk- neutral distribution of outcomes, whose mean is the risk- free 
rate, while also retaining the other features we have modeled using the 
closed form options pricing formulas. Monte Carlo simulation also al-
lows one to take into account (1) a stochastic path of interest rates, (2) 
the above mentioned correlation between default and the evolution of 
the plans’ funding ratios, and (3) the above mentioned time- varying 
correlation between stocks and bonds.
The development of such a simulation analysis is an important step 
for future research. It would begin with Monte Carlo analysis that repli-
cated the closed form solutions presented here, and then would add the 
correlations to improve the accuracy of the calculations.
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1. The defeasance value is the cost of providing collateral that defeats the liability 
without paying it off, because the collateral generates income sufficient to make all re-
quired future liability payments. 
2. Here, α = 12.54, β1 = 0.88 (0.45), β2 = 5.96 (0.58), β3 = –0.50 (0.10), R2 = 15.9%.
3. For one plan, there was not enough information to complete the imputation.
4. Specifically, the vector of zero coupon bond price maturing at every six months out 
to 30 years is given by  B = I + r( )
− 1 1, where I is the identity matrix, r is a lower triangular 
matrix whose rows correspond to the par yields at each maturity (interpolated where 
missing), and 1 is a vector of ones. We assume the yield curve is flat after 30 years.
5. Specifically, (15 – 12)*(6.6% – 3.3%) = 10%.
6. Here, $1.949 trillion in universe assets is derived as ($1.754 trillion sample assets / 
0.9), where the assumption is that the funding ratio of the remaining 10% of the universe 
is the same as the 90% sample.
7. Here, 7% = $118.6 billion / $1.638 trillion and 32% = $118.6 billion / $369 trillion.
8. Here, 11% = $358 billion insurance value / $3.215 trillion total liabilities.  Also, 28% 
= $358 billion insurance value / $3.215 trillion total liabilities.
9. That said, contributions are likely to be low if the sponsor is about to default. This 
will make the relationship between funding status and contributions nonmonotonic.
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